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CONSUMER LITIGATION FINANCING 
IN ILLINOIS: SEEKING SECURITY AND 
LEGITIMIZATION THROUGH 
REGULATION 
Michael J. Howlett∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
he Consumer Litigation Financing, also known as Consumer 
Litigation Funding, (“CLF”) industry has been the subject of 
an increasing number of commentaries and legislative initiatives 
across the United States. To date, relatively few jurisdictions 
have directly regulated the industry via statute, largely through 
industry-backed bills.  Additionally, several jurisdictions have 
regulated the industry through non-statutory means, including 
judicial rulings, voluntary agreements, and consent decrees. 
Illinois has previously attempted to regulate the industry on two 
occasions. After passing legislation out of the State Senate, the bill 
failed in the House in 2010. Last session, several bills failed to 
pass the Illinois General Assembly, which would statutorily 
recognize and regulate the practice of CLF, but the sponsor has 
indicated plans on pushing for passage in the upcoming 2014 
legislative session. The bill, while substantively similar to 
industry-backed statutory schemes in other jurisdictions, presents 
some unique provisions which have not been tested yet in other 
jurisdictions. This article will begin with a brief overview of the 
industry and the methods of regulation in other jurisdictions. 
Further, this article will analyze the unique provisions of the 
Illinois legislation, and the pending bill as a whole, in light of the 
relevant Illinois case law and the lobbying efforts surrounding the 
proposed legislation. 
Ultimately, the industry’s push for regulation will in 
effect, if not by purposeful design, achieve legitimization and 
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protection for the industry from legal challenges. The currently-
stalled legislative proposals would provide this legitimization. 
However, any of the proposals would also take the important 
steps toward protecting consumers of legal services through 
general regulatory oversight, capping interest rates, and allowing 
for a consumer protection study and a sunset provision to 
reevaluate the regulations after sufficient information is 
compiled. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF THE INDUSTRY 
The Third-Party Litigation Financing industry has three 
general segments: (1) Corporate Litigation Finance, (2) Direct 
funding to law firms, and (3) CLF. It is the third of these 
segments which merits, and thus far has attracted, the most 
judicial and legislative attention. This is primarily for two, 
facially apparent, reasons. First, in the other industry segments, 
the interests at stake are purely pecuniary as opposed to the 
compensation for damages sought in a personal injury case. 
Second, the parties seeking the funding in the first two segments 
are much more sophisticated actors than most personal injury 
plaintiffs. As a result, much of the newly passed regulation has 
focused on CLF, leaving the other segments to be regulated by 
investment and business-to-business lending statutes. 
Generally, there is a dearth of hard data concerning the 
CLF industry and the characteristics of funding arrangements. 
However, there are a number of sources and facts that help 
sketch a rough outline of the industry. First and foremost, it bears 
noting that the $100 million industry1 typically advances low 
dollar amounts to consumers, generally ranging from $1,750 to 
$4,500,2 or phrased another way, 10% to 20% of the plaintiffs 
expected award.3 That being said, several of the cases far 
exceeded this amount, with at least one consumer receiving an 
advance of $177,500.4 It is also worth noting that the majority of 
funding is used by consumers to cover rent or mortgages during 
litigation, with the greatest percentage aimed at preventing 
                                                          
 1  Binyamin Appelbaum, Lawsuit Loans Add New Risk for the Injured, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011. 
 2  Steven Garber, Alternative Litigation Financing in the United States: 
Issues, Knowns, and Unknowns, RAND CORPORATION, at 24-25 (2010) 
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP306.html. 
 3  Appelbaum, supra note 1. 
 4  Lawsuit Fin. v. Curry, 683 N.W.2d 233, 240 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). 
Howlett Article- Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/20/2013  4:04 PM 
142 Loyola Consumer Law Review Vol. 26:1 
foreclosures.5 
While the sums advanced to consumers generally are 
small, the interest charged on the advance seems to vary widely, 
depending on the case or funding company. The figure that is 
most often presented by the industry is 3-5% monthly 
compounding interest,6 which can, in itself, be in excess of 60% 
Annual Percentage Rate (“APR”).7 However, that figure is 
exclusive of fees on the advance, and is by no means standard.  
One company, LawCash, based out of Brooklyn, New York, 
reported their average APR on a funding agreement was 16-
48%.8 The American Legal Finance Association–a national 
business association representing the CLF industry–admits that 
just a few years ago, the typical monthly percentage was 10%.9 
As would be expected, sources that are not connected to 
the industry paint a much different picture. A variety of sources 
have reported APR’s at 100%,10 50% of the advanced amount 
owed in interest after six months,11 or even up to 280%.12 Clearly, 
there are at least a few instances of corporate actors charging far 
beyond the self-proclaimed industry standard interest rates. 
The rationale behind higher rates is the potential risk in 
such funding arrangements. Nearly without variation, these 
funding arrangements are non-recourse, meaning the CLF 
company has no legal recourse to collect either the principal 
amount or the interest if the consumer is unsuccessful in their suit 
or awarded an amount less than what is owed.13 Facially, this is a 
valid argument.  The higher the risk the company takes, the 
                                                          
 5  Gail Markels, Third Party Litigation Financing - Public Policy Aspects, 
Conference of Western Attorneys General, July 7, 2011. 
 6  Garber, supra note 2, at 12. 
 7  Darren McKinney, ATRA Opposes “Third-Party Financing of 
Lawsuits”, Press Release, June 14, 2010. 
 8  Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West 
of Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 
55, 73 (2004). 
 9  American Legal Finance Association, Legal Finance: Myth v. Fact, and 
How ALFA is Helping, AMERICAN LEGAL FINANCE ASSOCIATION (May 1, 
2013), 
http://www.americanlegalfin.com/alfa1/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=rTxg4YCm
3vA%3D&tabid=71&mid=553 [hereinafter “Myth v. Fact”]. 
 10  Appelbaum, supra note 1. 
 11  Id. 
 12  Lawsuit Fin., 683 N.W.2d at 240. 
 13  Oasis Legal Fin. Grp. v. Suthers, No: 12CA1130, 2013 WL 2299721, at 
*2-4 (Colo. App. Ct. May 23, 2013). 
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greater their interest rate should be, particularly if they have no 
recourse should the consumer’s suit be unsuccessful. However, 
far from providing funding for each and every interested 
consumer, the companies have a rigorous internal review, 
conducted by attorneys employed by CLF companies.14  The 
process is so rigorous that CLF companies have roughly a 70% 
rejection rate for funding requests,15 with some companies having 
individual rejection rates of nearly 95%.16 Further, it is common 
industry practice for funding companies to require that the 
consumer be represented on a contingency fee basis,17 adding 
another validator in the form of an attorney agreeing to bear the 
costs of litigation in expectation of an award or settlement. 
III.  CRITIQUES OF CONSUMER LITIGATION FINANCE 
Just as payday loans and the subprime lending market 
before it, CLF incurs its fair share of criticism from consumer 
protection advocates. Unlike payday loans and subprime lending, 
the industry also attracts criticisms from tort reform advocates. 
The consumer protection criticism centers on several aspects of 
the CLF industry: namely unduly high interest rates, 
transparency issues, and inflated claims of risk.18 Tort reform 
advocates criticize the industry for its potential effects on the 
quality and length of litigation, settlement amounts, and attorney 
client privilege.19 
Far and away, the majority of consumer protection 
critiques of CLF focus on the issue of predatory rates. Just as 
                                                          
   14   Oasis Legal Finance, The Approval Factors for Funding Personal 
Injury Lawsuits, OASIS LEGAL FINANCE, (May 1, 2013) 
https://www.oasislegal.com/legal_finance_services/lawsuit_funding_approval_
factors [hereinafter “Oasis Approval Factors”. 
 15  Appelbaum, supra note 1. 
 16  Lawrence Schaner, Third-Party Litigation Funding in the United 
States, REVISIT DE ARBITRAGEM E MEDIACAO Jan.-Mar., 175, 186 (2012). 
 17  American Legal Finance Association, Frequently Asked Questions, 
AMERICAN LEGAL FINANCE ASSOCIATION (May 1, 2013), 
http://www.americanlegalfin.com/faq.asp. 
 18  See generally McKinney, supra note 7; Lawsuit Fin., 683 N.W.2d at 
590. 
 19  See generally John Beisner, Jessica Miller & Gary Rubin, Selling 
Lawsuits, Buying Trouble: Third Party Litigation Funding in the United 
States, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 5 (Oct. 2009), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/images/stories/documents/pdf/research
/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf. 
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with payday loans, the CLF industry is being criticized for 
charging extraordinarily high rates, evidenced by interest charges 
of up to 280%.20 Even if the 280% APR is considered to be an 
outlier, rates of 100% APR have been consistently reported.21 In 
fact, the CLF industry itself has admitted to historically charging 
10% monthly compounding interest,22 far above statutorily 
authorized lending rates for other types of high-risk cash 
advances.23 Further, even though it is true that the industry as a 
whole has lowered the monthly percentages charged to 
consumers, 2 - 4% monthly compounding interest can often be in 
excess of 60% APR,24 in addition to the charges and fees 
companies typically charge. Even these lower rates are nearly 
double the statutorily authorized amounts for payday loans,25 and 
are certainly higher than credit card and traditional bank lending 
rates.26 
In response to claims of predatory lending, the industry’s 
typical response is that these higher rates are justified by the level 
of risk they assume in lending to consumers who may lose their 
case, precluding the company from recovering.27 While this 
argument is logically sound, the claims of risk may be inflated. 
Far from funding any risky suit where the plaintiff needs funding 
to bring their case, CLF companies generally have a rigorous 
vetting process, with in-house lawyers pouring over the case to 
determine not only the probability of success, but also a likely 
award amount.28 
In light of this vetting process, it is unlikely that many of 
the funded cases do not yield repayments to the companies. As 
such, the argument that the high-risk nature of the loans 
necessitates high interests rates, while not theoretically 
inaccurate, may not be an accurate representation of the real risks 
                                                          
 20  Lawsuit Fin., 683 N.W.2d at 240. 
 21  Appelbaum, supra note 1.; Caitlin Ginely, States Are Battleground in 
Drive to Regulate Lawsuit Funding, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, 
(May 1, 2013), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/02/02/2160/states-are-
battleground-drive-regulate-lawsuit-funding. 
 22  Myth v. Fact, supra note 9. 
 23  250 ILL. COMP. STAT. 670/15 (2011); Settlement Agreement and 
Consent Order: DFR-EU-2008-241, Md. Dept. of Fin. Reg. (Aug. 6, 2009) 
[“Consent Order”]. 
 24  McKinney, supra note 7. 
 25  205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 670/15 (2012). 
 26  Garber, supra note 2, at 10. 
 27  Martin, supra note 8, at 65. 
 28   Oasis Approval Factors, supra note 14. 
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faced by the industry.29 Unlike payday lenders, CLF companies 
have attorneys vetting consumer’s suits, determining both the 
likelihood and potential amount of an award or settlement.30 As 
noted above, this process results in an industry-wide rejection 
rate of 70% for funding requests,31 with individual rejection rates 
of nearly 95%.32 In fact, LawCash reported losing money on only 
4% of its cases in a two year period.33 By means of comparison, 
payday lenders have a default rate of 10-20%,34 far above most 
CLF companies. This apparent disparity between claims of risk 
and rates charged has led one commentator to note: “The realistic 
risk of non-recovery [sic] seems very little in comparison to the 
interest rate and is therefore unjustifiable in relation to the high 
cost of loans to the consumer.”35 
Related to the criticism of high rates, opponents of CLF 
are troubled by transparency issues surrounding the industry. In 
soliciting potential consumers, the industry generally uses 
television advertising,36 often in the same tenor and tone of 
payday lenders37 and structured settlement and annuity 
purchasers.38 While the commercials tout quick access to much 
needed cash, conspicuously absent is any information relating to 
the interest rates, terms of the lending agreements, or length of 
the agreement. 
The selective non-disclosure of terms does not end with 
advertisements. Former CLF company employees have reported 
that they were instructed not to mention rates to consumers 
                                                          
 29  Tanya Taubman, Access to Justice with Protection: Improving 
Alternative Litigation Financing with Consumer Protections, paper submitted 
to Alternative Litigation Funding: a Roundtable Discussion Among Experts, 
at 35 (2012). 
 30  Appelbaum, supra note 1. 
 31  Id. 
 32  Schaner, supra note 16, at 186. 
 33  Martin, supra note 8, at 73. 
 34  Megan McArdle, On Poverty, Interest Rates, and Payday Loans, THE 
ATLANTIC, Nov. 18, 2009, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2009/11/on-poverty-interest-
rates-and-payday-loans/30431/. 
 35  Taubman, supra note 29, at 35. 
 36  Oasis Legal Finance, Lawsuit Funding TV Commercials, OASIS LEGAL 
FINANCE, (May 1, 2013), https://www.oasislegal.com/resources/commercials. 
 37  Cash Net USA, It’s Done With CashNetUSA, CASH NET USA (May 1, 
2013), http://www.cashnetusa.com/blog/its-done-with-cashnetusa/. 
 38  J. G. Wentworth, Commercials, J. G. WENTWORTH, (May 1, 2013), 
available at http://www.jgwentworth.com/about/commercials. 
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unless asked directly.39 In another instance, a consumer was 
quoted a relatively modest APR of 39%, but was later charged 
upwards of 76% of the loan amount after the first year.40 
Apparently the practice was so widespread in the state of New 
York that then-Attorney General Eliot Spritzer entered into an 
agreement requiring a code of conduct and setting base industry 
practices for New York CLF companies.41 
The final consumer protection argument against CLF 
focuses on the core business model of the industry, specifically 
that it is a for-profit business with little to no interest in justice.42 
The gist of the argument is that these companies, like any 
investor, are concerned with rates of return, regardless of any 
underlying benefits provided or detriments caused to the legal 
system.43 Rather than being concerned with providing access to 
the judicial system for those who could not otherwise seek justice 
and compensation for injury, the industry is more concerned with 
profit. Buford Capital’s CEO Chris Buford’s comments are 
illustrative of the view that pervades the industry: “We’re 
fundamentally a capital provider. We take a share of the ultimate 
recovery, having taken the risk of funding the case. Forget this 
being about the law or litigation - we’re providing risk funding 
for an investment in the same way as in any other sector of the 
market. If the investment pays off we make a return on the 
capital we’re investing.”44 In light of that frank self-assessment of 
the industry, it is clear that the argument that the CLF industry is 
unconcerned with considerations of justice is not unfounded. 
That being said, being unconcerned with justice is not the same 
as promoting injustice, and certainly does not preclude the 
industry from encouraging justice, even if it is not a primary goal. 
While the consumer protection arguments against CLF 
                                                          
 39  Appelbaum, supra note 1. 
 40  Id. 
 41  Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law §63(15) In the 
Matter of Plaintiff Support Services, Inc.; Pre-Settlement Finance, LLC; 
QuickCash, Inc.; Magnolia Funding, LLC BridgeFunds Limited; Plaintiff 
Funding Corporation d/b/a LawCash; Oasis Legal Finance Co., LLC; The 
Whitehaven Group, LLC; New Amsterdam Capital Partners LLC d/b/a 
LawMax, N.Y. Att’y Gen. (2005). 
 42  Matt Byrne, World’s Largest Dispute Financier’ Targets US Litigation 
Market Uptick, THE LAWYER (May 1, 2013), available at 
http://www.thelawyer.com/worlds-largest-dispute-financier-targets-us-
litigation-market-uptick/1006248.article. 
 43   Id. 
 44  Id. 
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are certainly valid and troubling, most of the criticism in 
academia and most of the opponents lobbying against the 
industry in state legislatures are focused on tort reform generally. 
Instead of opposing the industry because of its impacts on 
consumers, the critics and opponents focus on the effects to the 
legal system as a whole, particularly any increase in litigation or 
awards amounts. 
The first and most pervasive tort reform criticism of CLF 
is the effect on the quality and quantity of litigation.45 On its face, 
this is a logical argument: the more money given to consumer 
initiating actions will increase the overall number of suits and 
incentivize consumers with frivolous claims to bring suit by 
removing the risk. The argument of increased quantity of 
litigation is also straight forward: the basic business model of the 
industry is to provide money to consumers who have claims that 
are likely to be victorious to pay for expenses during the course of 
the litigation. Logically, absent this funding, it is unlikely that the 
consumer would be able to bring their suit. 
While there is insufficient data on the American CLF 
industry to confirm or deny this claim, Australia has seen a 16.5% 
increase in litigation following the acceptance of the industry.46 
The largest increases in Australia were in class actions and 
insolvency suits, which are not generally funded by the CLF 
industry in the United States, and are prohibited in most 
statutory schemes regulating the industry.47 However, it should 
be noted that this argument is proffered by traditional tort reform 
advocates, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the 
American Tort Reform Association,48 which represent parties 
with little interest in injured parties receiving compensation, as 
they typically are the defendants in suits. This argument is 
further cast into doubt by the fact that most companies require a 
consumer to have legal representation on a contingency fee basis 
                                                          
 45  Garber, supra note 2, at 28-31. 
 46  Beisner, supra note 19. 
 47  Jason Lyon, Revolution in Progress: Third Party Funding of American 
Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 571, 591 (2010); 2013 IL H.B. 531 HA 2 (NS), 
2013 Illinois House Bill No. 531 House Amendment 2, Illinois Ninety-Eighth 
General Assembly - First Regular Session; 2013 IL H.B. 2301 HCA 1 (NS), 
2013 Illinois House Bill No. 2301 House Committee Amendment 1, Illinois 
Ninety-Eighth General Assembly - First Regular Session. 
 48  Sherman Joyce, Comments of ATRA Concerning Alternative Litigation 
Financing, ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, March 7, 2011. 
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and to have already filed their suit to obtain funding.49 
Directly related to the argument that CLF will increase 
the overall volume of litigation is the argument that an increase 
in litigation will be caused by frivolous claims being filed as a 
form of speculation. Again, as with quantity, the quality 
argument appears to be facially sound: the less risk there is to the 
party to bring a suit, the more incentivized he will be to bring a 
long-shot suit that has the potential for a high award but may not 
be meritorious. While this argument is also typically advanced by 
the tort reform lobby,50 it is cast into doubt for much the same 
reasons as the quantity argument. The high denial rate of 70%51 
coupled with the contingency fee representation requirement52 
suggests that a frivolous claim would likely not make it through a 
CLF company’s internal assessments. Moreover, a frivolous 
lawsuit, likely to be thrown out and unlikely to settle, would be a 
poor investment and a bad business strategy for the company.53 
Aside from impacts on the litigation process itself, the tort 
reform critics of CLF argue the industry negatively impacts 
settlements, both in the length of time it takes to settle a case and 
because it may force a consumer to forego an otherwise 
reasonable settlement offer on account of their obligation to the 
CLF company.54 Both of these arguments stem from the same 
underlying concern that litigation funding artificially inflates the 
value of a claim, dis-incentivizing reasonable settlement amounts, 
and prolonging litigation.55 This force manifests itself in two 
ways. First, the funding provided to consumers will likely make 
the consumer disinclined to take early settlement offers because 
the funding ameliorates their pressing need to settle early—even 
if the settlement is fair.56 Second, and nearly the opposite of the 
first, as the litigation continues the consumer may be dis-
incentivized to settle later in the process because of the mounting 
                                                          
 49   Oasis Approval Factors supra note 14; Garber, supra note 2, at 29. 
 50  Joyce, supra note 48. 
 51  Appelbaum, supra note 1. 
 52  Oasis Approval Factors, supra note 14. 
 53  Myth v. Fact, supra note 9. 
 54  Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 99 Ohio St. 3d 121, 
124-25 (2003). 
 55  Joyce, supra note 48. 
 56  Mariel Rodak, It’s About Time: A Systems Thinking Analysis of the 
Litigation Finance Industry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 
503, 522 (2006). 
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interest and fees arising from the funding.57 
This later argument is of particular concern, and was the 
basis for the Ohio Supreme Court decision to ban the practice in 
2003,58 though it was later overturned by the Ohio state 
legislature.59 In Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp, 
the Ohio Supreme Court held that CLF was prohibited as 
champertous in Ohio because it impedes the settlement of the 
underlying case.60 The funding arrangement in the case 
effectively barred the consumer from settling for anything less 
than $28,000 in order to receive any portion of a settlement.61 
This is before taking into account the consumer’s own internal 
settlement amount. This additional deduction, beyond that of a 
contingency fee, has the potential to make any reasonable 
settlement offer effectively too low, and force the consumer to 
push for trial in the hopes of a greater jury award.62 
The final argument advanced by tort reform critics of 
CLF is the industry’s effect on attorney client privilege, and to a 
lesser degree the effect on the work product doctrine. Generally, 
attorney client privilege protects the right to prevent disclosure of 
certain information communicated in confidence between an 
attorney and his or her client.63 This privilege is generally waived 
if the confidential information is communicated to a third party.64 
The work product doctrine is an extension of this privilege, which 
protects documents prepared for litigation or in reasonable 
anticipation of litigation.65 As such, the concern regarding CLF is 
that attorney client privilege will be waived when an attorney or 
the consumer communicates the particulars of the claim to the 
company assessing the claim.66 While an inadvertent waiver of 
                                                          
 57  Rancman, 99 Ohio St. 3d at 124. 
 58  Id. 
 59  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.55 (West). 
 60  Rancman, 99 Ohio St. 3d at 124. 
 61  Id. 
 62  Rancman, 99 Ohio St. 3d at 124. 
 63  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1317 (9th ed. 2009) (“client’s right to refuse 
to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential 
communications between client and attorney”). 
 64  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. 
 65  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1746 (9th ed. 2009): “Tangible material or 
its intangible equivalent — in unwritten or oral form — that was either 
prepared by or for a lawyer or prepared for litigation, either planned or in 
progress.” 
 66  Grace Giesel, Alternative Litigation Finance and the Work-Product 
Doctrine, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083, 1096 (Winter 2012). 
Howlett Article- Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/20/2013  4:04 PM 
150 Loyola Consumer Law Review Vol. 26:1 
the privilege is certainly a cause for concern, the risk appears to 
be minimal. Most statutes and proposed bills specifically exempt 
communications to funding companies from waiving the 
privilege.67 Further, the investment interests of the CLF industry 
would be ill-served if in assessing claims the client is placed in a 
weaker position waiving the privilege.68 
In assessing the entirety of the arguments against CLF, all 
are serious issues with potential harm to consumers and further 
burden an already expensive and overused court system. Yet, 
most of the above arguments can be ameliorated either by 
comprehensive regulation or by taking into account the self-
interest of the industry, with the exception of the high interest 
rates and their corresponding effect on settlements. The effects on 
settlements cannot be regulated because it rests on the internal 
motivations of consumers who need compensation for injuries, 
compensation that will be naturally reduced by their obligation to 
the funding company. So long as interest rates remain high, the 
effect on settlements is likely to remain. 
IV.  ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF CONSUMER LITIGATION 
FINANCE 
Despite the arguments against CLF, in certain 
circumstances, the service provides a measurable social utility by 
allowing underprivileged plaintiffs to bring a claim. Arguments 
in support of the industry generally center on two points: the 
benefits provided to underprivileged consumers, allowing them to 
bring claims when they otherwise could not, and internal control 
measures and safeguards which protect consumers and limit the 
potential negative impacts of the industry.69 
The most compelling argument in support, and the most 
difficult to rebut, is the social utility the industry provides. 
Regardless of the business motivations of the industry, the fact 
remains that their services allow consumers to bring claims for 
compensation when they would be otherwise unable.  The typical 
                                                          
 67  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.55 (West); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-3306. 
 68  Letter from Juridica Capital Management Ltd. to ABA Comm’n on 
Ethics 20/20, Comments to Issues Paper Concerning Lawyer’s Involvement in 
Alt. Litig. Fin., at 64, 68 (Feb. 2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/ethics_202
0/comments_on_alternative_litigation_financing_issues_paper.authcheckdam.
pdf. 
 69   Myth v. Fact, supra note 9. 
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phrase used is “keys to the court house for the poor.”  Moreover, 
the supporters of the industry argue that the funding advanced to 
the consumer is typically a relatively small amount, in the tens of 
thousands of dollars.70 Further, these relatively low amounts are 
typically sought, and used for legitimate and important financial 
obligations.  The single largest use of funds is to prevent 
foreclosures, with many instances of the funds also being used for 
basic living necessities such as food, and not  for litigation or 
attorney fees.71 
The industry is providing an undeniably positive social 
function, truly granting the proverbial keys to the courthouse. 
However, the price that accompanies this apparent godsend 
cannot be overlooked. Since CLF companies charge an amount 
which can take nearly all of the proceeds, the question must be 
asked - is the consumer in any better of a position by taking this 
funding? 
The general industry response to that question is “yes.”72 
The industry contends, and logic would suggest, that financial 
assistance to low income consumers early in litigation will 
increase their bargaining power, which allows them to withstand 
low settlement offers.73 While this is undoubtedly true, it does not 
account for the arguments of exceedingly high rates and such 
rates forcing consumers to forego potentially reasonable 
settlement offers, opting to go to trial in search of a higher award. 
Aside from the social utility provided by the industry, the 
other main argument in support of the industry is aimed at 
ameliorating the perceived ills of the industry. In response to the 
aforementioned criticism, the American Legal Financing 
Association and its members have adopted the Best Practices 
Code of Conduct.74 The six point voluntary agreement consists of 
the following pledges: (1) obtaining a written acknowledgement 
from the consumer’s attorney; (2) the agreement between the 
company and the consumer will not constitute ownership of the 
claim and the company will not direct or interfere with the 
litigation; (3) companies will not advance money in excess of the 
                                                          
 70  Martin, supra note 8, at 73. 
 71  Markels, supra note 5; Myth v. Fact, supra note 9, at 1. 
   72  Markels, supra note 5. 
 73  Id. 
 74  American Legal Finance Association, Industry Best Practices - ALFA’s 
Code of Conduct, AMERICAN LEGAL FINANCE ASSOCIATION (May 1, 2013), 
available at http://www.americanlegalfin.com/IndustryBestPractices.asp  
[hereinafter “Industry Best Practices”]. 
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consumer’s needs; (4) companies will not intentionally overfund 
cases; (5) companies will not engage in false advertising or 
intentionally mislead a client; and (6) companies will not offer to 
or pay commission or referral fees to attorneys for recommending 
clients.75 
Certainly all of these provisions are commendable and 
have the potential to address the concerns of both consumer and 
tort reform advocates alike. However, the Code of Conduct is less 
magnanimous than it may appear at first glance. The Code of 
Conduct was created immediately after and is heavily based on 
an agreement between the industry and the Attorney General 
Spitzer of New York.76 Following a review of the business 
practices of several companies in New York, Attorney General 
Spitzer entered an agreement with the companies, for which each 
company was charged a $5,000 fee for “costs”.77 The agreement 
regulated practices much in the same way as the subsequent code 
of conduct; yet, the New York agreement went much further in 
regulating the industry,78 and shares many of the regulatory 
provisions in subsequent legislation backed by the industry.79 
Moreover, while the Code of Conduct does amend some of the 
critics concerns, it is notably silent on permissible interest rates.80 
An additional argument in support of the industry rests on 
its internal assessment measures as a control on frivolous 
litigation.  In assessing this argument, the practices of Oasis Legal 
Finance are illustrative of wider industry practices. Oasis funds 
cases only after a number of criteria have been satisfied.81 For 
instance, Oasis will only fund personal injury cases where there 
were severe injuries, particularly if they resulted in time off 
work.82 Oasis generally does not fund soft tissue injury cases 
because of the volatility in assessing awards.83 Additionally, Oasis 
assesses the defendant in the case, with “strong liability” often 
being determinative, as well as the defendant’s ability to pay 
                                                          
 75  Industry Best Practices, supra note 74. 
 76  Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 41. 
 77  Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 41; Industry Best Practices, 
supra note 74. 
 78  Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 41. 
 79  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §1349.55; (West); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-3301-3309; 
Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 9-A, §12-101-107. 
 80  Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 41. 
   81   Oasis Approval Factors, supra note 14. 
 82  Id. 
 83  Id. 
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damages.84 As previously noted, Oasis is in line with the industry 
practice of requiring consumers to be represented on a 
contingency fee basis, ensuring that another party be equally 
willing to “assume the risk of winning the case.”85 Finally, and 
perhaps most illustrative, Oasis requires a “sufficient margin for 
investment” before agreeing to fund a case.86 In addressing the 
margin of investment, Oasis looks to other liens and expenses that 
will be paid out of litigation proceeds.87 Oasis examines these 
liens because CLF obligations are typically the lowest priority 
claims on litigation proceeds, as would be the case under several 
of the prospective Illinois bills that would regulate the industry.88 
As with the voluntary Code of Conduct, Oasis’s approval 
factors address the criticism of tort reform advocates. Yet, it also 
serves to undercut the argument that CLF provides access to 
underprivileged consumers. It is clear that the overall interest of 
the company is a return on its investment, and not the actual 
need of the consumer. 
In assessing the totality of the arguments for and against 
the industry, it is clear that some are more pervasive, and 
therefore more critical to address in any regulatory scheme. These 
issues are the high interest rates and the corresponding effects on 
settlements on the one hand, and the undeniable fact that the 
funding, despite its profit driven motives, provides a tangible 
benefit to low income consumers seeking to pursue a legal claim 
on the other. 
V.  CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEMES 
To date, several jurisdictions have taken on the task of 
regulating the industry, with the apparent intent of amplifying 
the social utility of the CLF industry while accounting for the 
accompanying social ills. Jurisdictions that have regulated the 
industry have done so in three distinct ways: (1) judicial 
oversight, (2) executive agreements and regulation, and (3) 
statutory regulation of the industry. 
Several jurisdictions have held third party financing of 
litigation to be invalid either under champerty or usury. 
Champerty is generally defined as “an agreement between a 
                                                          
 84  Id. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. 
 88  See infra pp. 123, 130. 
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stranger to a lawsuit and a litigant, by which the stranger pursues 
the litigant’s claim as consideration for receiving part of any 
judgment proceeds; the act of maintaining, supporting or 
promoting another person’s lawsuit.”89 In one example previously 
discussed, the Ohio Supreme Court held that third party finance 
of litigation was void as champertous.90 Nevertheless, several 
years after that case decided, the Ohio state legislature 
overturned the ruling and passed a regulatory scheme supported 
by the industry.91 
Other jurisdictions have had more success in regulating 
litigation funding agreements by judicial ruling. In Oklahoma, 
the Tenth Circuit prohibited certain third-party funding 
agreements as champertous.92 In Parks v. American Warrior Inc., a 
party agreed to pay for a third of the cost of litigation in return 
for 40% of the proceeds.93 The court found the agreement to be 
“clearly champertous,” because it was “officious intermeddling in 
a suit which in no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting 
the party, with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it.”94 
Perhaps more relevant than third-party funding generally, 
several jurisdictions have specifically struck down forms of CLF 
as either usurious or champertous. In an example from Michigan, 
the state Supreme Court struck down a CLF agreement as 
usurious.95 In Lawsuit Financial, LLC v. Curry, the court held 
that non-recourse loans were still loans, regardless of their non-
recourse nature.96 Because the agreements were found to be loans, 
the agreements were held to be usurious, as interest rates of 280% 
far exceeded Michigan’s maximum lawful annual interest rate of 
seven percent.97 
While non-recourse loans are not generally seen as loans 
by most jurisdictions and therefore not subject to usury laws, a 
Colorado State Appellate Court ruled in Oasis Legal Finance et. 
al. v. Suthers that such financial agreements are loans for the 
purposes of regulation.98  In reviewing an appeal of a granted 
                                                          
 89   BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 262 (9th ed. 2009). 
 90  See infra pp. 113. 
 91  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.55 (West). 
 92  Parks v. Am. Warrior, Inc., 44 F.3d 889, 893 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 93  Parks, 44 F.3d at 893. 
 94  Id. 
 95  Lawsuit Fin., 683 N.W.2d at 240. 
 96  Id. 
 97  Id. 
 98  Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., LLC, v. Suthers2013 WL 2299721 at *1 (Colo. 
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motion for partial summary judgment de novo, the court affirmed 
the district court’s ruling that a non-recourse provision does not 
remove a funding agreement from the definition of the term loan 
under the state Uniform Consumer Credit Code (“UCCC”).99  In 
affirming the lower court, the appellate court held that debt, 
including contingent debt, falls under the broad definition 
previously adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court as aligning 
with the UCCC’s underlying purpose of protecting consumers.100 
The court rejected the litigation finance companies’ arguments 
that c the loans were non-recourse, on the grounds that the 
companies have recourse if the consumers break their contracts - 
for example, if consumer wins and does not or cannot pay the 
principle plus interest and fees.101 As such, while usury was not at 
issue in the appellate review of the partial summary judgment,102 
it is entirely foreseeable that when the UCCC is applied in full 
force, the agreements could be found to be usurious. 
In another such example, a Minnesota court ruled CLF to 
be void as champertous,103 similar to the Ohio Supreme Court 
opinion in Rancman. 104 A Minnesota State Appellate Court ruled 
in Johnson v. Wright that an agreement contingent upon the 
outcome of litigation would be champertous.105 While the court 
held that the agreement at issue was not champertous as it was 
not contingent upon the outcome of the case, the court did find 
the agreement champertous in assigning a percentage of the 
proceeds, and therefore a percentage of the legal claim, to the 
lender.106 
While several courts have held that non-recourse funding 
agreements are not loans for the purpose of regulation, 
jurisdictions are split on the issue.  Some courts have held that 
the non-recourse nature of these funding agreements renders 
them beyond the scope of the relevant jurisdiction’s usury laws.107 
                                                          
App. May 23, 2013). 
 99  Id. at *10-13. 
 100  Id. at *10-11. 
 101 Id. at *15. 
 102  Id. at *17. 
 103   Johnson v. Wright, 682 N.W. 2d 671, 677 (Minn. App. 2004). 
 104   See infra pp. 113. 
 105   Johnson, 682 N.W. 2d at 677. 
 106   Id. 
 107   See Dopp v. Yari, 927 F. Supp. 814, 822 (D.N.J. 1996) (stating a 
litigation funding agreement is not usurious because it was a joint undertaking 
between the parties involved); See also Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 684 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding because the profit or interest was 
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Though certain jurisdictions have succeeded in generally 
protecting consumers and the legal system from champertous 
agreements, judicial oversight on this matter is a crude 
mechanism. Relying on judicial oversight tends to lead to “all or 
nothing” regulation.  Recognizing this, several jurisdictions have 
taken a different approach - regulating the industry through the 
state executive branch.108 The prime example of this is Maryland, 
where the Commissioner of Financial Regulation entered into a 
consent order with Oasis Legal Finance in response to licensing 
complaints against the company.109 In response to the complaints, 
Maryland issued a cease and desist order to end all of Oasis’s 
litigation financing.110 In response to the cease and desist order, 
Oasis denied allegations that the agreements were loans or 
advances under Maryland law, and therefore subject to the 
Maryland usury laws.  Nevertheless Oasis agreed to cease 
business conduct until Maryland amends the relevant laws.111 In 
addition to having operations ceased in the state, Oasis received a 
$105,000 fine.112 
In another aforementioned example, former New York 
Attorney General Spitzer entered into an agreement with CLF 
companies in 2005.113 In addition to the provisions that led to the 
adoption of the ALFA Code of Conduct,114 the agreement added 
additional provisions specifically aimed at consumer 
protection.115 These provisions include: (1) disclosure and 
itemization of fees and APR; (2) a five day cancellation policy; 
and (3) a natural language provision for those who do not speak 
English or Spanish.116 These provisions generally serve as the 
basis for legislation in several other jurisdictions.117 
                                                          
contingent, the transaction cannot constitute usury); See also Anglo-Dutch 
Petroleum Int’l, LLC v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 94 (Tex. App. 2006). 
(indicating a litigation funding agreement where the investor’s return on 
investment is contingent on a company’s recovery cannot be usurious). 
   108   Consent Order, supra note 23; Assurance of Discontinuance, supra 
note 41. 
 109   Consent Order, supra note 23. 
 110   Id. 
 111   Id. 
 112   Id. 
 113   Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 41. 
 114   See infra pp. 116. 
 115   Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 41. 
 116   Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 41. 
 117   Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §1349.55; (West); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-3301-
3309; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 9-A, §12-101-107. 
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To date, the CLF industry has backed successful 
legislation recognizing and regulating the industry in three states, 
Ohio, Maine, and Nebraska.118 Generally, the relevant statutes of 
these three states are substantively the same, with minor 
differences: (1) disclosure of rates, fees and funding amounts; (2) 
five day cancellation policies; (3) prohibiting companies from 
affecting the outcome of the case; (4) mitigating impacts on 
attorney client privileges; (5) prohibiting commissions and 
referral fees for lawyers; (6) banning companies from making 
decisions with regards to the course of litigation; and (7) 
establishing the priority of liens, with the CLF companies’ 
interest as the lowest priority.119 Specifically, the statutes capped 
the number of months during which fees can be charged at either 
36120 or 42.121 Notably absent in any of the laws is a cap on the 
interests rates and fees to be charged.122 
VI.  RELEVANT ILLINOIS STATUTES AND CASE LAW 
Illinois has not yet addressed the issue of CLF directly, 
and the law is currently in a state of flux.123 The only case dealing 
with the issue in Illinois was a suit over a choice of venue clause 
in a funding agreement signed in North Carolina, where the court 
held that an agreement entered into in North Carolina could not 
be litigated in Cook County.124 Nevertheless, a look at Illinois 
statutes and case law is illustrative in assessing whether CLF 
could be successfully challenged, absent the proposed regulatory 
scheme supported by the industry and its allies. 
The common law and statutory provision most generally 
applicable to CLF is maintenance. Maintenance is defined as 
“assisting in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit to a litigant by 
someone who has no bona fide interest in the case.”125 Further, 
Illinois has a statute specifically prohibiting maintenance,126 as 
                                                          
 118   Id. 
 119   Id. 
 120   Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.55; (West); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-3305. 
 121   Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 9-A, § 12-105. 
 122   Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §1349.55; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-3301-3309; Me. 
Rev. Stat. tit. 9-A, §12-101-107. 
 123   Jennifer Gregory, Payday Loans for Lawsuits? Champerty in Illinois, 
CBA RECORD 60, 61 (Oct. 2008). 
 124   Parson v. Oasis Legal Fin., LLC., 715 S.E.2d 240, 242 (N.C. App. Ct. 
2011). 
 125  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1039 (9th ed. 2009). 
 126   720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/32–12 (2009). 
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well as barratry, which is essentially the continuing practice of 
maintenance.127 The statutory prohibition on maintenance has 
been interpreted by Illinois courts as the officious intermeddling 
in a suit by one who has no interest and is not a party by 
maintaining a party, financially or otherwise, with a view toward 
promoting litigation.128 Illinois does allow selfless maintenance 
when the recipient of the support is either one’s family member 
or a person who is impoverished.129 
Related to maintenance is the offense of champerty. 
Further, Illinois courts have interpreted champerty as an 
agreement to pay for litigation in return for part of the proceeds. 
In other words, “an essential element necessary to constitute 
champerty [is] an agreement to divide the proceeds of 
litigation.”130 While champerty is not specifically recognized by 
statute in Illinois, it has not been abolished by statute, surviving 
in common law.131 It should be noted that while champerty does 
not apply to contingency fee arrangements in Illinois, direct 
lending to a client by a lawyer is still prohibited.132 In fact, only 
the civil-law jurisdiction of Louisiana,133 and a minority of other 
jurisdictions including Alabama, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Montana, North Dakota, and Texas permit lawyers to lend to 
clients under certain circumstances.134 
The final basis for challenging CLF has been usury laws.  
Usury is an excessive rate of interest charged above the legal 
amount to the borrower of money.135 Illinois has regulated 
interest rates of similar high risk funding agreements, such as 
Consumer Installment Loans (“payday loans”), setting the interest 
rate cap at 36% APR.136 Therefore, any APR above 36% would 
                                                          
 127   720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/32-11 (2009). 
 128   Savage v. Seed, 401 N.E.2d 984, 989 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). 
 129   720 ILCS 5/32–12 (2009). 
 130   Wyman-Gordon Co. v. Lynch Area Fire Prot. Dist. 366 N.E. 2d 1055, 
1057 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977). 
 131   Milk Dealers Bottle Exch. v. Schaffer, 224 Ill. App. 411, 415 (1st Dist. 
1922). 
 132   ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N, Ethics Ops. 295 (1968). 
 133   LA ST. BAR ART 16 RPC Rule 1.8. 
  134   AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA/BNA Lawyer’s Manual on Professional 
Conduct, (Sept. 26, 2013, 2:35 PM), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/docs/ 
ABA_Manual_Financial_Assistance.pdf. 
 135   Central Life Ins. Co. of Illinois v. Sawiak, 262 Ill. App. 569, 575 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1931). 
 136   Consumer Installment Loan Act, 205 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 670/15 
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be considered usurious under the Consumer Installment Loan 
Act. While consumers and state officials have had success in 
challenging or regulating CLF agreements on the basis of 
usury,137 it is unlikely that this would be an effective challenge in 
Illinois. This is because under Illinois law, an agreement for 
which repayment is based on an uncertain contingency cannot be 
usurious.138 Since CLF is contingent upon the consumer receiving 
an award or settlement, it is highly unlikely that CLF could be 
successfully challenged on these grounds, as in other such 
jurisdictions.139 
The state of the law in Illinois regarding these offenses as 
applied to third-party litigation funding is by no means settled.140 
The last Illinois Supreme Court case addressing third-party 
funding of litigation was decided in 1914.141 In Reiman v.  
Morrison, a party had an agreement whereby he would recover 
one-half of any interest in stolen property another party received 
from pending litigation.142 The Court held that such an agreement 
was not void as champerty because the party had not agreed to 
bear any of the direct costs of the litigation.143 In upholding this 
agreement, the Court laid out how to successfully challenge an 
agreement as champertous: to make a case of champerty, “it must 
be shown that the cost and expenses of a suit. . . are paid or 
agreed to be paid by one not a party to the suit.”144 
The last Illinois state appellate court opinion addressing 
third-party funding of litigation was decided in 1989.145 In 
Puckett v. Empire Stove Co., a landlord assigned their claim to a 
tenant to bring suit against a manufacturer of a defective gas 
valve, in return for terminating the tenant’s right to contribution 
from the landlord.146  The court held that the arrangement was 
not champertous since the landlord was not a stranger to the 
suit.147 While upholding this particular arrangement, the court in 
Puckett noted: “champerty and maintenance have been 
                                                          
(West 2011). 
 137   See infra pp. 116-118. 
 138   Aldrich v. Aldrich, 260 Ill. App. 333, 365-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1931). 
 139   See supra pp. 120-22. 
 140   Gregory, supra at note 122. 
 141   See generally Rieman v. Morrison, 264 Ill. 279 (1914). 
 142   Id. at 281. 
 143   Id. at 282. 
 144   Id. at 286. 
 145   Puckett v. Empire Stove Co., 539 N.E.2d 420183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). 
 146   Id. at 427. 
 147   Id. 
Howlett Article- Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/20/2013  4:04 PM 
160 Loyola Consumer Law Review Vol. 26:1 
disapproved by the courts as public policy because a litigious 
person could harass and annoy other.”148 
Finally, the Illinois State Bar Association has previously 
issued an opinion on the topic of third-party financing, stating 
that it is not unethical for an attorney to assist a client in 
obtaining loans related to litigation.149 However, the opinion was 
narrowly tailored to situations where the loan was used to pay 
attorney fees, not where lump sums of money were given to 
clients to cover basic expenses.150 
In light of the state of the law in Illinois, and the successful 
challenges to the funding in other jurisdictions, it is foreseeable 
that a consumer could successfully challenge a funding agreement 
in an Illinois court. This uncertainty is troubling to the industry, 
and is presumably the driving purpose behind their push for 
regulation. Generally, CLF companies are averse to having their 
funding arrangements go to trial, and they prefer settlements.151 
For instance, the head of a Brooklyn-based CLF company was 
quoted as saying, “[e]verything that might have to go before a 
judge, you stay away . . . we don’t want judges to shine a light on 
us.”152 This animosity to judicial review seems to be predicated on 
the idea that judges perceive a “smell of predatory lending” on the 
industry.153 Clearly, the judicial challenges to agreements in 
various jurisdictions have incentivized the industry to fund cases 
expected to settle before trial. 
Yet, even if the industry is successful in keeping their 
agreements out of the glare of judicial review, there is still the 
risk of state executive officers challenging and regulating the 
industry, as occurred in Maryland and New York.154 The reality 
is that if a consumer is successful at trial, his award will be likely 
greater than any amount for which he could settle. After finding 
success in Nebraska, Maine and especially Ohio by successfully 
preempting or even overturning legal challenges to funding, the 
stage is set in Illinois for a successful industry push for CLF 
                                                          
 148   Id. 
 149   ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N, ISBA Advisory Opinion on Professional 
Conduct, (Sept. 26, 2013, 4;13 pm), http://www.isba.org/sites/default/ 
files/ethicsopinions/92-09.pdf. 
 150   Gregory, supra note 122. 
   151   Appelbaum, supra note 1. 
 152   Id. 
 153   Martin, supra note 8, at 63. 
 154   Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 41; Consent Order, supra 
note 23. 
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friendly regulation. 
VII.  PENDING ILLINOIS LEGISLATION 
Turning to the previous attempts at statutory recognition 
of CLF in Illinois, the failed 2010 attempt, Senate Bill 3322,155 
(“SB 3322”) was substantively similar to the bills passed in other 
jurisdictions.156 Additionally, the most recent attempt to regulate 
the industry in Illinois, House Bill 2301 (“HB 2301”) as 
introduced, was roughly the same proposal as offered in SB 
3322.157 HB 2301 would have created the Non-Recourse Civil 
Litigation Funding Act.158 
Unlike other jurisdictions, the opponents of CLF, and 
particularly the Illinois Chamber of Commerce and the Institute 
for Legal Reform, offered a competing proposal.159 House Bill 
2300 (“HB 2300”) would have regulated CLF as the state 
regulates other cash advance arrangements, such as payday 
loans, under the Consumer Installment Loan Act.160 Notably, this 
would cap the interest rate of CLF agreements at 36% APR.161 
Additionally, the bill would require disclosure of the agreement to 
both the court and the defendant.162 
HB 2300 and HB 2301, as introduced, quickly lost 
support, in favor of a succession of compromise amendments to 
HB 2301. House Committee Amendment 1 to HB 2301 (“HCA 
1”) added additional provisions to those in the previous legislation 
and HB 2301: (1) a natural language contract requirement for 
non-English speakers; (2) a prohibition on funding for class action 
suits; (3) a prohibition on attorneys and law firms having a 
financial interest in CLF companies who provide funding for 
their clients; (4) a cap on payments to only proceeds from the 
pending litigation; (5) a requirement for companies to only receive 
an assignment of a contingent right to receive proceeds from a 
                                                          
 155   S.B. 3322, 96th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009). 
 156   See supra pp. 17. 
 157   H.B. 2301, 98th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013). 
 158   Id. 
 159   Bethany Krajelis, Thapedi Introduces Legislation on Hourly Billing 
Rates, Lawsuit Lending, ILLINOIS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (May 1, 2013), 
http://ilchamber.org/news/8617/thapedi-introduces-legislation-on-hourly-
billing-rates-lawsuit-lending/. 
 160   H.B. 2300, 98th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013). 
 161   Consumer Installment Loan Act, 205 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 670/15 
(West 2011). 
 162   H.B. 2300, supra note 160. 
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claim, and not an assignment of the claim itself, which is not to be 
determined as a percentage of the proceeds; (6) an allowance for 
companies to fund a consumer who has previously been funded 
by another company without purchasing the assignment of the 
first company; (7) caps of specific charges to the consumer; 
codification of  the claim priority of the company; and (8) caps on 
the fee assessment at 36 months.163 
While many of these provisions were instituted in various 
other jurisdictions, Illinois also proposed a provision that is 
wholly unique. HCA 1 proposed a dual lending provision, 
providing that consumers seeking litigation funding would have 
the option of entering into a non-recourse funding agreement or a 
traditional loan regulated under the Consumer Installment Loan 
Act (“CILA”).164 If the CILA option was taken, the APR would be 
capped at 36%, as it is for other CILA loans, such as payday 
loans.165 If the non-recourse funding option were taken, the 
interest rate would be capped at 36% APR with an additional 
monthly 3% deferment fee.166 Further, it should be noted that the 
CILA option would be regulated under CILA, and not generally 
under the Act.167 
HB 2301 was subsequently amended by House Committee 
Amendment 2 (“HCA 2”), adding: (1) additional disclosure 
sections; (2) CLF is assignable and not to be construed as a loan 
or investment for the purpose of regulation; (3) licensure 
requirements; (4) a data reporting plan to compile a consumer 
protection study; and (5) a sunset provision repealing the bill for 
re-passage following the  culmination of the consumer protection 
study.168 The data collected by this provision would include the 
number of transactions, the amount of funding in each 
transaction, the number of transactions required to be repaid, the 
average annual fee rate, and the total number of transactions 
where the company received full repayment, partial repayment 
and no repayment.169 HCA 2 also contains a superiority clause, 
meaning that in the event of a conflict between the legislation and 
                                                          
 163  H.B. 2301, Comm. Amend. 1, 98th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 
2013). 
 164   Id. 
 165   Id. 
 166   Id. 
 167   Id. 
 168   H.B. 2301, Comm. Amend. 2, 98th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 
2013). 
 169   H.B. 2301, Comm. Amend. 2 supra note 168. 
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other state laws, this legislation supersedes those other laws.170 
While Oasis continued its support of this proposal and the Illinois 
Chamber continued its opposition, the Illinois Trial Lawyers 
Association reserved judgment on HCA 2. Perhaps because of 
this, HCA 2 to HB 2301 failed to pass out of committee before the 
relevant House deadline, and was re-referred to the Rules 
Committee pursuant to House Rule 19.171 
That was not the end of the push for regulation during the 
98th General Assembly.  State Representative Andre Thapedi (D 
- 32nd) the sponsor of the previous bills, amended HB 531, a shell 
bill which had been passed out of committee earlier in the session 
and was on 2nd Reading in the House, with a regulatory scheme 
similar to HCA 2. House Amendment 1 (“HA 1”) made several 
changes to HB 531. While HA 1 to HB 531 preserved the choice-
of-loan provision, it changed the percentages for non-recourse 
loans from 36% with a 3% monthly deferment fee to 36% with a 
1.5% bimonthly deferment fee.172 HA 1 to HB 531 also changed 
the required disclosures to the consumer, requiring the disclosure 
of the total dollar amount owed to the company at 30 day 
intervals for 1080 days, after which no fees could be assessed.173 
Additionally, the amendment added that notwithstanding notice 
of the non-recourse funding agreement, the consumer’s attorney 
is not responsible for paying or ensuring payment of the 
obligation.174 As with HCA 2 to HB 2301, the Illinois Trial 
Lawyer Association did not officially support HA 1 to HB 531. 
An additional amendment was also filed for HB 531.  HA 
2 to HB 531 offered several changes to HA 1, specifically: (1) 
excluding entities that engage in commercial to commercial 
business transactions from regulation under the act; (2) requiring 
disclosures of the total dollar amount owed at 180 day intervals, 
as opposed to 30 days under HA 1, for 1,080 days; (3) shortening 
the cancelation window from 10 days to 7 days; (4) deleting the 
provision added in HA 1 that notwithstanding notice of the non-
recourse funding agreement, the consumer’s attorney is not 
responsible for paying or ensuring payment of the obligation; (5) 
deleting the provision prohibiting funding of class action suits; 
and (6) adding that nothing in the act shall cause non-recourse 
                                                          
 170   Id. 
  171   Rules of the Illinois House of Representatives, Ill. House R. 19(a). 
 172   H.B. 531, Comm. Amend. 1, 98th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 
2013). 
 173   Id. 
 174   H.B. 531, Comm. Amend. 1, supra note 172. 
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lending to be deemed a loan or investment and such agreements 
cannot be regulated as such.175 
Additionally, like HA 1, HA 2 to HB 531 preserves the 
choice-of-loan provision, but changes the interest rate caps for 
non-recourse funding arrangements back to 36% with a 3% 
monthly deferment fee from the 1.5% bi-monthly fee in HA 1.176 
Finally, HA 2 would delay the sunset provision and date of 
consumer protection study from May 31, 2015 to May 31, 2019.177 
Neither HA 1 nor HA 2 contained the superiority clause 
contained in HCA 2 to HB 2301.178 HA 2 to HB 531 was 
supported by the traditional supporters of the industry including 
Oasis and several other CLF companies, the Illinois Trial 
Lawyers Association, and the American Legal Finance 
Association. The opponents to the industry were also largely the 
same, but were joined by the Illinois Department of Financial 
and Professional Regulation, the department tasked with 
regulating the industry under the various bills and amendments. 
Despite the rush of amendments to HB 531, it failed to 
meet the 3rd Reading deadline and was re-referred to the Rules 
Committee pursuant to House Rule 19.179 As it stands now, HCA 
2 to HB 2301 and both HA 1 and 2 for HB 531 are effectively 
stalled for the duration of this legislative session, but will be 
pending in the Rules Committee in January 2014, following the 
veto session. Rep. Thapedi, after accommodating the various 
stakeholders in HA 1 to HB 531, still did not expect any of the 
stakeholders to fully support HA 1.180 Thapedi recognized that 
many of the stakeholders will “equally work against the bill 
because they are not getting everything that they want.”181 
Nevertheless, the Thapedi thinks “the bill that’s filed is soup, 
and . . . it’s ready to go.”182 As such, it is entirely foreseeable that 
Rep. Thapedi will continue his press for statutory recognition and 
regulation of the industry. 
                                                          
 175   H.B. 2301, Comm. Amend. 1, supra note 163. 
 176   Id 
 177   Id 
 178   H.B. 531, Comm. Amend. 1, supra note 172. 
 179   Rules of the Illinois House of Representatives, Ill. House R. 19(a). 
 180   Andrew Maloney, Lawsuit Loans Face Regulation in Illinois General 
Assembly, CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULLETIN, Apr. 16, 2013. 
 181   Id. 
 182   Id. 
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VIII.  ANALYSIS OF THE BILLS 
In assessing the competing provisions offered during the 
legislative session, it is worth noting the various pieces of 
legislation were largely industry bills. Oasis has been the 
strongest and most vocal supporter of the House proposals, 
supported in their efforts by the American Legal Finance 
Association. This is further evidenced by the overwhelming 
similarity between the initially proposed HB 2301 and legislation 
passed in other jurisdictions. Obviously, there are certain 
provisions contained in the various proposals that are not part of 
the industry’s ideal bill. Nonetheless, the substance of the bill will 
still accomplish the goal of legitimizing the industry through 
statutory recognition. That the industry wants to ensure the 
practice remains legal in Illinois should go without saying; Cook 
County is one of the largest unified court systems in the world.183 
The industry would certainly be willing to go to great lengths to 
ensure its continued operation in such a large market. 
Perhaps most notable about the lobbying efforts behind 
the bill was the shifting stance of the Illinois Trial Lawyers’ 
Association (“ITLA”). Traditionally a strong voice in the state 
capitol, ITLA supported several versions of the legislation but 
not all. The combined weight of their lobbying strength when 
added to that of the CLF industry could prove to be the decisive 
factor in passing a regulatory scheme in 2014. 
It is also worth noting that the opponents of the bill are 
generally the tort reform advocates that have opposed the 
industry’s lobbying efforts elsewhere. The Illinois Chamber of 
Commerce and the Institute for Legal Reform, a wing of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, were the lead opponents of the measures 
in Illinois. While their opposition may be tangentially related to 
consumer protection, the Chambers’ main interest is in limiting 
litigation since its members are often the defendants, mimicking 
the U.S. Chamber’s opposition.184 As such, this seems to be a 
compromise bill in a true sense of the term, in that the tort reform 
advocates achieved victories with the inclusion of the sunset 
provision, ban on referral fees, and interest rate caps on an other-
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http://www.cookcountycourt.org/ABOUTTHECOURT/OfficeoftheChiefJudg
e.aspx (Last visited Sept. 28, 2013). 
 184  See infra p. 111. 
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wise industry supported bill.185 
To the substance of the bills, as stated above, any of the 
pending amendments, if passed, would accomplish the industry’s 
goal of statutory recognition and regulation of the industry. This 
seems to be of the utmost importance to the industry, as it would 
circumvent the harsh judicial review process imposed by other 
jurisdictions.186 As previously noted, members of the industry see 
judicial oversight as the worst possible form of scrutiny and 
regulation to which the industry could be subjected.187 There is 
no greater example of this process than Ohio, where the industry 
engaged in an extensive lobbying effort to overturn the State 
Supreme Court’s decision to strike down all CLF 
arrangements.188 
The industry’s fear of judicial review and oversight 
striking down funding arrangements would likely be completely 
amended should the pending legislation be passed. Taking 
champerty first, it is almost certain that any claim would be 
unsuccessful should any of the pending proposals be passed. 
Since champerty only survives at common law in Illinois,189 any 
legislative enactment would supersede the claim, unless the 
legislation were struck down as unconstitutional. 
The impact on usury challenges would be much the same. 
Aside from the fact that usury has been found not to apply to 
non-recourse loans in Illinois,190 even the CILA loans authorized 
under provisions would not be seen as usurious since any loan 
would be capped at 36% APR.191 Any funding agreement 
charging less than that rate would not be usurious by definition. 
It is unclear how statutory prohibition on maintenance 
would be interpreted in light of the pending proposals. The 
picture is most clear for HCA 2 to HB 2301, which includes a 
superiority clause.192 This clause, were it to be enacted, would 
effectively protect the industry from any challenge based on 
                                                          
 185   Non-recourse Civil Litigation Advances, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§1349.55 (West 2013); Nonrecourse Civil Litigation Act, Neb. Rev. Stat § 25-
3304 (West 2012); Maine Consumer Credit Code, Me. Rev. Stat. Tit. 9-A, §12-
105 (2013). 
 186   See infra pp. 119-22. 
 187   See infra pp. 128. 
 188   See infra pp. 111. 
 189   See infra pp. 125-26. 
 190   Aldrich, 260 Ill. App. at 365-66. 
 191   H.R. 531, Comm. Amend. 1, supra note 172. 
 192   H.R. 2301, Comm. Amend. 2, supra note 168. 
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maintenance. It is unclear, though unlikely, whether a challenge 
based on maintenance would be successful should either HA 1 or 
HA 2 to HB 531 pass since they lack a superiority clause.193 
In comparing the unique provisions of the Illinois 
proposals to regulatory schemes in other jurisdictions, the 
provision that is the furthest departure from other jurisdictions is 
the choice-of-loan mechanism. No other jurisdiction that has 
regulated CLF has authorized a recourse loan agreement.194 In 
theory, this is fundamentally divergent from other schemes. In 
practice, it is likely that this will operate as if the consumer 
sought a payday loan instead of litigation financing to support 
themselves during the initial stages of litigation. While the 
relative evils of payday loans may be argued, it remains that such 
cash advances are legal and regulated in Illinois.195 Moreover, it is 
likely that this provision was included to allow currently 
operating CLF companies to continue operations during the three 
month period allowed for the Illinois Department of Financial 
and Professional Regulation to go through the rule-making and 
licensure process. 
The Illinois proposals also differ from other statutory 
regulations of the industry by prospectively implementing a cap 
on interest rates. Alternatively capped at 36% with a 3% monthly 
deferment fee196 and 36% with a 1.5% bi-monthly deferment 
fee,197 the bills, if passed, would cap the allowable interest rates at 
roughly 72% APR plus the deferment fees. While this is certainly 
high, much higher than most loans, it is worth noting that this 
would be a ceiling. The loan would still not have to be paid back 
if the consumer’s claim was unsuccessful, and competition would 
likely drive the interest rates lower in most instances. This is 
certainly extraordinarily high at first blush, and, in light of the 
choice-of-loan provision, may drive consumers to opt for the 
traditional CILA loan, with little consideration of the recourse 
nature of such a funding agreement. 
                                                          
 193   H.R. 531, Comm. Amend. 1, supra note 172. 
 194   Non-recourse Civil Litigation Advances, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
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2013). 
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While the choice-of-loan and rate cap provisions are 
important steps and are sure to meet resistance from both 
proponents and opponents of the industry, the most important 
provisions in the bill are the data reporting, consumer protection 
study, and sunset provision. The single biggest hurdle in assessing 
and regulating the industry to date has been the lack of data 
regarding the particulars of the industry. On each side of the 
debate parties generally rely on anecdotal evidence. While it is 
true that many of the companies use hard data to support their 
arguments, it is generally limited and unverifiable, as it comes 
from internal records. Regardless of which bill ultimately passes, 
by requiring all CLF companies to report hard data on their 
funding agreements, the consumer protection study that would be 
submitted to the General Assembly on the eve of the sunset 
provision will provide vital data necessary in evaluating the 
effectiveness of the regulatory program. 
The previously unregulated nature of this industry means 
that it is highly unlikely that any regulatory package will be 
perfect. The sunset provision allows the critics of the legislation 
an opportunity to seek further regulation in two to five years, 
depending on which amendment is ultimately adopted and 
passed. Further, it gives the industry an opportunity to prove its 
merits, and achieve the legitimization it is seeking. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
CLF is a hotly contested issue in law review articles, and 
in court rooms and state legislatures across the country. It is in 
the latter that the proponents and opponents have debated the 
issue in Illinois. After a half dozen proposals, and several 
parliamentary maneuvers, the issue has stalled for the 2013 
legislative session, waiting in committee for the 2014 legislative 
session. 
Merely because the industry is supporting such regulation 
does not mean that the regulations are per se weak or inadequate. 
A cursory glance shows that the regulations proposed will serve a 
workable canvas for additional provisions to be added, either 
during the legislation process or on the re-passage of the 
legislation following the sunset provision. Even without 
accounting for amending the proposal, the provisions common to 
the various proposals - interest rate caps, bans on referral fees, 
natural language provision, cancellation policy, disclosure of 
terms and fees, and priority of claims - all address vital concerns 
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of both the tort reform lobby and consumer protection advocates. 
The choice-of-loan provision will certainly cause some 
regulatory issues and the interest rate caps on the non-recourse 
loans have a high sticker price, making the recourse loan an 
attractive option. But such issues will arise when attempting to 
regulate any industry which was pervasively unregulated. That is 
why the most important provision in the any of the pending bills 
will likely be the consumer protection study and sunset provision. 
CLF certainly has it is unsavory aspects, but it does serve 
a social good, and the pending legislation is a good starting point, 
contingent of course upon the results of the proposed consumer 
protection study. 
 
